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 Abstract 
This paper investigates the economic impacts of the reforms both on the EU sugar sector but also 
more globally and examines the intended and unintended consequences of the reforms.  This 
provides insights into the likely impacts of the further reforms proposed for 2015 – namely the 
removal of sugar beet quotas within the EU.  We find, in line with other studies that whilst the 
reforms have improved the economic efficiency of the EU sugar sector the nature of the reform 
process has meant that these gains have not been maximised.  This is due to the fact that production 
was cut in some of the more efficient regions of Europe as well as the least efficient. Our modelling 
highlights that the reforms have led to alternative trade patterns emerging both internally within the 
EU as well as externally.  Internally, cessation of production in a number of countries provides 
opportunities for those remaining in production.  Externally the significant decline in EU sugar on the 
world market has provided opportunities for other countries.  It would appear that Brazil and 
Thailand have been amongst the main beneficiaries of the disappearance of EU sugar from the world 
market. 
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Introduction 
The EU sugar regime has been part of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) since 1968, and prior to 
2006, had never been fundamentally reformed.  Prior to 2006 the regime was based on minimum 
support prices, production quotas, export refunds and tariff protection, whilst preferential 
arrangements allowed raw cane sugar to be imported, mainly into the UK, from traditional (ACP) 
suppliers. Quotas had at times been cut in order to meet WTO ceilings on subsidised exports. A 
system of producer levies contributed to the financing of the export refunds. 
Unlike other sectors of the CAP, sugar was left untouched by the reforms of 1992, 2000 and 2003, 
and therefore the sugar regime came under increasing pressure to promote greater competitiveness 
and stronger market orientation in line with the reformed CAP. In addition further pressures were 
being placed on the managed EU sugar market by the Everything But Arms (EBA) and Balkans 
initiatives which allowed unlimited duty-free preferential imports and the WTO case on EU exports, 
led by Brazil, Australia and Thailand. 
The reform process effectively began in September 2003, when the European Commission proposed 
three broad possible ways forward. They were: 
 Extend the present regime beyond 2006, cutting quotas as necessary; 
 Reduce the EU internal price, with a view to eliminating quotas; 
 Completely liberalise the current regime, including tariffs. 
 
As usual the process of agreeing a reform package involved extensive negotiation between the 
member states and the initial proposals were extensively modified before the final package was 
agreed. 
According to the European Court of Auditors the reforms had three main objectives: 
 to ensure the competitiveness of the EU sugar industry; 
 to stabilise the markets and to guarantee the availability of sugar supplies; 
 to contribute to providing a fair standard of living for the agricultural community via 
instruments put in place to mitigate the significant direct and indirect social and economic 
impact on the agricultural community in the regions affected. 
 
Though it is clear that a number of sub-objectives were required from the reforms, not least making 
the regime WTO compliant by reducing the pressure to export EU sugar on to the world market. 
The 2006 reforms marked a major change in the EU sugar regime. Details of the reforms can be 
found in council regulation (EU, 2005) but the key measures introduced can be summarised as:  
• Merging “A” and “B” quota into single production quota. 
• Additional quota made available for purchase at EU level (up to 82,847 tonnes available 
for the UK) to maintain production in “C” producing countries. 
• Production charge of 12 €/tonne introduced from 2007/8 on processors based on their 
sugar quota. 
• Restructuring levy on processors to be paid in 2006/7 to 2008/9 to fund the 
restructuring measures of the reform. 
• Sugar for biofuel, chemical and pharmaceutical industries to be excluded from quota. 
• 36% price cut for raw sugar from 497 €/tonne to 335 €/tonne in 2009/10. 
• 40% reduction in the minimum beet price to producers by 2009/10 
• Abolition of intervention by 2010. Thereafter private storage aid to be introduced as a 
safety net. 
• Direct income support for beet growers based upon 64.2% of the notional price cut. 
• Introduction of voluntary restructuring scheme to encourage factory closures and 
surrender of quota. Scheme to be funded by a levy on quota holding sugar factories. 
 
The reforms aimed to reduce EU sugar production by 6 million tonnes over 4 years (to around 
13/14m tonnes, raw value).  This level of change was expected to lead to a reduction in exports of 
between 4 and 4.5m tonnes (down to 1.4m tonnes) and a doubling of sugar imports to around 4.5m 
tonnes (Gudoshnikov, 2010).   
This paper investigates the economic impacts of the reforms both on the EU sugar sector but also 
more globally and examines the intended and unintended consequences of the reforms.  The 
impacts on prices, profitability, structures, trade and welfare  
The next section outlines the methodology adopted for this study.  The results are then presented 
examining the impact on prices, profitability, structures, competitiveness, production, trade and 
welfare.   The final section considers the overall impact of the reforms and discusses the unresolved 
issues and looks forward to the future reforms.  
Approach 
A five fold approach was adopted for the study  
1. Literature review of both published and grey literature 
2. Detailed examination of farm business data to assess impact on farm profitability 
3. Modelling of reforms using a modified GTAP model 
4. Interviews with representatives of a range of stakeholder organisations 
5. Stakeholder workshop 
 
Literature Review 
A detailed analysis of available literature was undertaken from a wide variety of academic and 
industry sources.  Ahead of the reform process Defra published an extensive Regulatory Impact 
Assessment (RIA) (Defra, 2005), this provided a useful background document against which the 
actual impacts could be compared with the predicted impacts.  In November 2010, the European 
Court of Auditors published their analysis of the regime which also provides useful information for 
consideration in this study.  In the realisation that not all information on the sugar sector is likely to 
be in the wider public domain, stakeholder contacts were also asked to provide any information that 
they thought would be helpful to the study.  
Analysis of Farm Business data 
To assess the farm level impacts of the reform process on farms in England, analysis of Farm 
Business Survey (FBS) data was undertaken.  The Farm Business Survey is an annual survey 
undertaken by Defra of over 1800 farms in England.    Analysis involves examination of the changes 
to crop area (within the business unit), yield, price, input costs, gross and net margins  to enable 
measurement of changes in the farm production system.  The published data is weighted using 
consistent FBS methodology that can be compared to all outputs from the FBS since 20051.  Similar 
detailed production data is available for the 2002 harvest year as result of an earlier study for Defra2 
and therefore longer term comparisons can be made. Although caution needs to be exercised where 
comparing the 2002 and 2009 datasets as methodological differences exist.  The 2002 data was 
unweighted and some (enterprise level) costs were imputed based on data available for the North 
West and Eastern Counties.  With this caveat some time series data presented within this study 
draws from both sources. 
In terms of numbers of sugar beet farms, in 2009 the FBS included 139 sugar beet producing farms in 
England for which full margin data was available on 133 farms.    Among the 2009 farms, 45 
participated in the 2002 study and a further 34 remained in the FBS having ceased sugar beet 
production.  Many of the farms surveyed in 2002 had left the FBS due to a requirement that farms 
remain in the survey for a maximum of 15 years, although some simply opted to leave the FBS which 
is a voluntary survey. It should be noted that FBS data is published only if the sample size comprises 
of at least 15 farms 
Use is also made of agri-benchmark data from a number of European countries for the 2009 harvest 
year (agri-benchmark, 2010).  Although the data does not allow a comparison of the situation pre 
and post the reforms it does provide useful insight into the profitability of sugar beet production 
after the reforms had been fully implemented  
Stakeholder interviews and Workshop 
At the outset of the study it was realised that whilst much information may be gleaned from 
available literature, the relative recent nature of the reforms and also the nature of the sugar 
industry itself means that some information may not be in the public domain.  Therefore it was 
decided that a key part of the study would involve semi-structured telephone interviews with key 
stakeholder organisations and businesses.  Interviews were held with a range of stakeholder 
organisations, representing farmers, processors, refiners, isoglucose/starch producers, ACP 
countries and sugar users.  
                                                          
1
 Farm Business Survey Definitions, Defra 
http://archive.defra.gov.uk/evidence/statistics/foodfarm/farmmanage/fbs/documents/fbs-definitions.pdf 
2
 University of Cambridge and RAC (2004) Economic, Social and Environmental Implications of EU Sugar 
Regime Reform. Final Report to Defra 
Towards the end of the study the same stakeholders were invited to a workshop at Hughes Hall 
Cambridge where preliminary results were presented and discussion held.  Feedback generated at 
this workshop was used to inform the final analysis. 
GTAP model and data 
The main quantitative component of this research employs the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model and accompanying database In its current incarnation, 
version 7.1 of the database (Narayanan and Walmsley, 2008) is benchmarked to 2004. Version 7.1 
represents a significant advance on the previous version in terms of (inter alia) broader regional 
coverage (112 regions), improved trade and demand elasticity estimates and significant refinements 
to the support and protection data. The ‘standard’ neoclassical comparative static GTAP model 
employs neo-classical optimising behaviour to derive Hicksian consumer and intermediate demands. 
Regional utility is aggregated over private demands (non-homothetic), public demands and savings 
(investment demand). Production, which is ‘demand driven’ through a series of accounting 
conventions and market clearing balances, is characterised employing a perfectly competitive, 
constant-returns-to-scale technology, and bilateral imports are differentiated by region of origin 
using the Armington (1969) specification. The model incorporates five factors of production, where 
skilled/unskilled labour and capital are perfectly mobile, whilst land and natural resources are both 
sector specific with the former moving ‘sluggishly’ between productive sectors. In all factor markets, 
full employment is assumed (long run). Finally, investment behaviour functions through the creation 
of a fictitious ‘global bank’. This entity collects investment funds (savings) from each region and 
disburses them across regions according to a rate of return or a fixed investment share mechanism. 
To capture as far as possible the intricacies of the sugar policy, three specific modelling extensions 
were added to the standard GTAP model: the ‘old’ A, B and C sugar quota mechanism; tariff rate 
quotas and imperfect competition to characterise the concentrated nature of EU processed sugar 
production. Examining the issue of EU sugar quotas, the most detailed modelling endeavour to date 
is that of Frandsen et al. (2003). Although published prior to the enactment of the 2006 sugar 
reforms, it successfully captures all of the salient modelling mechanisms inherent within the ‘old’ EU 
sugar system in our benchmark year. Employing a series of step functions (‘complementarities’), the 
authors characterise ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ quotas, institutional prices for each quota; a treatment of quota 
rents; a detailed implementation of the self financing mechanism and a mechanism for calibrating 
the relative cost competitiveness of the EU member states. 
Employing GEMPACK (reference) model code, the current study adopts the approach of Frandsen et 
al. (2003). To calibrate each EU member’s position on the sugar supply curve (i.e., ‘A’, ‘B’, or ‘C’) and 
calculate quota rents, information on institutional prices and marginal costs (i.e., shadow prices) are 
necessary, whilst some estimate of each country’s level of competitiveness is required (i.e., is the 
region an ‘A’, ‘B’ or ‘C’ producer?). Initially, we followed the approach adopted in Frandsen et al. 
(2003) who assumed that farmers overshoot beet production by two times the standard deviation of 
variation.3 Thus, employing time series data ‘average’ sugar production is measured as arithmetic 
average total production in each year minus 2 times the standard deviation. This statistic for each EU 
                                                          
3
 Frandsen et al. (2003) note that farmers deliberately overshoot their quotas because they are contractually 
bound to deliver a specific quantity of sugar beet to the refineries. Failure to fulfil the contract may result in a 
loss of quota rights. 
member is matched with corresponding A and B quota allocations, which indicate whether a region 
is an A, B, C or non producer (NP) in 2004. Our initial estimates suggested the following classification 
(Table 1): 
Reg Status Reg Status Reg Status Reg Status Reg Status 
AUT C EST NP HUN C LUX NP SVK C 
BEL B FIN C IRE A MAL NP SVN A 
CYP NP FRA C ITA A NLD C ESP B 
CZE C GER C LAT A POL C SWE C 
DNK C GRE A LTU A PORT A GBR C 
Table 1: Classification of EU25 sugar production 
Source: Own calculations 
However, cross referencing our calculations with actual data from Eurostat on sugar production (at 
constant prices) from 2004, we discovered that the supply responsiveness of a minority of EU25 
regions was not consistent with their sugar status reported in the table above. For example, the 
Czech republic witnesses a 15% reduction in sugar beet production, despite the fact that we have 
classified it as a (competitive) C producer. We consequently revised the Czech republic as a B 
producer. Similarly, with production reductions in excess of 50%, Finland, Spain, Hungary, and 
Slovakia were reclassified as A producers.  
Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) follow the publically available model code provided in Elbehri and Pearson 
(2005). To support the TRQ model code, additional secondary data (WTO, 2005) is necessary for the 
quota fill rates, as well as the in-quota and over-quota tariff rates. Following guidance in Elbehri and 
Pearson (2005), modelling assumptions are employed to reconcile these data with the tariff data 
inherent within the GTAP database. For the purposes of this study, TRQs are only implemented on 
EU sugar imports, whilst it is assumed that the tariff quota rate is filled on all EU imports. 
Finally, our characterisation of imperfect competition in the sugar processing sector draws on similar 
CGE studies (Hertel 1994, Harrison et al. 1994) combining strategic (Cournot) conjecture, with 
freedom of entry/exit of firms.4 In the model variant employed here, the mark-up (P > MC), 
presented in equation 1 below, is allowed to adjust endogenously for each representative firm,5 and 
vary according to the seller’s market (i.e., domestic vs. export):6 
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4
 Arguably, food processing sectors, typically regarded as oligopolistic, are more aware of quantity changes in 
perishables across bilateral routes vis-à-vis the alternative of price (Betrand) as a strategic variable. 
5
 Owing to a lack of data, it is assumed that all firms in the imperfectly competitive industry are symmetric (i.e. 
they have the same cost and technology structure and face the same demand curve). 
6
 In the appendix, a full derivation of the mark-ups is shown. 
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  - changes in industry output (Z) with respect to changes in firm output (Qi). 
N - The number of firms in the industry. 

1
 - The absolute value of the inverse elasticity of demand for the composite industry tradable. 
The freedom of entry/exit coupled with the accounting condition of long run zero profits determines 
output per ‘representative’ firm. A full appendix shows the derivation of the mark-ups. 
Having described the development of the GTAP model the following section present the key findings 
from the modelling exercise and other analyses with respect to changes in price, profitability, 
structures, production and the impacts on trade and welfare 
Results 
Prices 
A key component of the reform process was a cut in prices to beet growers and processors.  
Available evidence indicates that during the first three years of the reform, the EU sugar market 
price was stable and around the reference price.  In addition, the EU selling price followed the 
downwards movement of the reference price.  However, more recently the sugar market price has 
been above the reference price. A key cause of this has been changes in world prices which have 
increased markedly since the end of 2007, actually surpassing the EU average price in early 2010.   
The world price has had such an influence on EU prices due to the  fact that the EU moved into a 
deficit position (due to the reduction in quotas) and therefore the internal EU market was more 
intimately linked with external world market and therefore the rising world price has put upward 
pressure on EU prices.   This more direct link between world markets and EU prices may be seen to 
be a direct result of the reform process.   
Our analysis indicates that it was not the decline in EU production that led to the increase in world 
price, but a combination of other factors including poor harvests in the main producing regions and 
an increasing global demand for sugar.  In fact, our model results indicate that, if everything else was 
held equal, then the reforms themselves would only have had a marginal impact on world prices (an 
estimated 1.8 per cent rise)  
Our model results also indicate that, ceterus paribus,  the reforms would generally have led to the 
marked reductions in domestic prices as expected (although varying by country according to their 
cost structures) had it not been for the changing world maket situation.   Within the UK the impact 
of the price cuts has also been mitigated through the weakening of the currency due to the 
macroeconomic situation within the country. 
The thorny issue of price transmission 
Whilst it is clear that, initially at least, the price cuts were fully felt by the sugar supply sector there 
has been considerable controversy as to whether the price cuts have been fully transmitted through 
the supply chain to reach consumers.  Available data suggests that retail prices did not  fall in line 
with the cut in prices.  Whilst sugar users contend that this is attributable to generally rising costs 
within the supply chain (energy, labour, etc), there is still though an unanswered question as to the 
extent that sugar users have been able to ‘capture’ the price cuts and not pass them on to 
consumers.    
Effect of the Sugar Reform on the UK domestic prices 
Figure  1  comprises two panels.  The upper panel presents the average retail price, the wholesale 
price, the EU reference price and the world price.  The marketing margin for white granulated sugar  
can be seen as the difference between the retail price and the wholesale price. The lower panel 
presents the average retail price and the minimum and maximum values of a sample of prices 
collected by the Office of National Statistics (ONS).  
Three facts are worth noting from the figure. First, the wholesale price converged to the reference 
price as expected after  the reform of the sugar sector.  Second, in sharp contrast with the wholesale 
price, the retail price of sugar followed an increasing trend, that seemed closer to the world price 
than to the wholesale price, leading to  an increasing marketing margin. Third, the price dispersion 
around the average retail price increased as the world price and the UK wholesale price became 
closer.   
Figure 1 - UK White granulated sugar prices - Marketing margin and price dispersion 2006-2011 
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Figure 1 illustrates that for whatever reason, domestic consumers of white granulated sugar did not 
benefit from the decrease in the wholesale price due to the reform.  
Price transmission has long been a controversial issue in agricultural supply chains.  It is, of course, 
not necessarily the case that consumers will benefit one for one from reductions in the producer 
price. This is due to the fact that the formation of retailers’ prices is a complex process, which 
includes not only the cost of the raw material (i.e., sugar) but also such components as energy and 
labour costs. In addition, the nature and extent of price transmission from processors to retailers in 
sugar prices might be affected by the degree of concentration in both the processing sector and the 
distribution channels (Netherlands Economic Institute, 2000).  Concern was expressed by a number 
of stakeholders about the perceived lack of transmission of the price cuts.  As one expressed it 
‘billions have effectively been taken from the primary producers and processors and consumers 
have not received the benefits.’ Sugar users argue that the price of sugar is only one component and 
it is the increased cost of other raw materials that has led to the apparent disconnect between 
changes in producer and retail prices.  However, the European Court of Auditors note that the EU 
are sufficiently concerned at the apparent lack of pass-through of the price cuts to consumers that 
they are commissioning work to study this (ECA, 2010).   
This is a key issue, because as noted above, the Defra RIA identified benefits to consumers as a 
major source of the welfare benefits of the reform.  If we have a situation where the benefit is really 
just transferred from one sector (sugar processors/refiners and farmers) to another (users of sugar) 
then it may be argued that the overall welfare gains for society have been diminished.   
Concern has been expressed that the price reported by the EU fails to act as a signal that sugar is in 
short supply and thus triggering possible remedial action by policy makers. This is in part the nature 
of the statistics collected as they relate to the fact that the majority of sugar is bought yearly ahead 
(the sugar marketing year) and it is also based on the price for the major part bought.  Therefore, it 
does not reflect the price that a buyer would have to pay on the spot market and is unable to 
capture for example the price raising effects of shortages.  This does raise a question of the role of 
the prices in signalling potential shortages and the requirement for action to address these 
shortages 
Profitability 
At the farm level in the UK, our analysis suggests that whilst in certain years profitability has declined 
(as a result of yield and price impacts) overall profitability of sugar production has been maintained 
(Figure 2).  In part this can be seen as a result of:  
 Improvements in average yields (in part brought about by lower yielding producers leaving 
the industry) 
 Changes in market conditions ameliorating the price cuts  
                                                          
7
 It is important to note that in order to compute the retail price range, the ONS eliminates the extreme values 
and the range is based on only 80 per cent of the sample. 
 Compensation payments from the EU 
 
Figure 2  Average Gross Margin Performance of Sugar Beet Production 2000 to 2009 
 
More broadly, analysis of exemplar data from 2009 for a number of countries across Europe, 
highlights that there remains a wide divergence in profitability of the sugar crop at the farm level 
after the reforms (Figure 3).  Amongst other factors this spread in profitability has been maintained 
because quotas were not tradeable across countries and therefore efficiency gains have been made 
within and not across EU states.  
Figure 3: Gross margins for selected farms in  EU countries in 2009 
 
Source: Agri-benchmark/University of Cambridge  
At the processing level, the initial failure of reforms to remove capacity, coupled with the inability to 
export surplus production due to WTO restrictions led to oversupply within the EU and downward 
pressure on prices.  Therefore profitability of processing (and refining) companies was reduced 
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significantly in the first years of reform.  However, the recent shortages and changes in world market 
prices coupled with major structural changes in processing, have led to improved profitability in this 
sector. 
It is clear that the recent shortages, and the apparent inability of the mechanisms put in place 
through the reforms to deal with the shortages have dominated discussion and have threatened to 
overshadow wider issues associated with the reform process. 
Structural Change 
The European Court of Auditors (2010) noted that before the reform in EU-25 there were 285,000 
sugar beet growers cultivating 2.1 million ha of beet for sugar and making use of the services of 
machinery contractors; over 8,000 cane growers cultivating 43,000 ha of sugar cane, mainly in EU 
overseas territories. After the reform in EU-27 the number of growers had decreased to 164,000 
sugar beet growers cultivating 1.4 million ha of beet for sugar and making use of the services of 
machinery contractors; and fewer than 8 000 sugar cane growers. 
There is no doubt that major structural change has occurred within the sugar processing sector 
following the reforms of 2006.  According to the European Court of Auditors (2010), before the 
reform there were 189 sugar factories employing 50,000 workers, 16 isoglucose and four inulin 
syrup producers, producing 820, 000 tonnes and 7 full time refiners importing and processing 
annually 2 million tonnes of raw sugar derived from sugar cane. After the reform the number of 
sugar factories has reduced to 114 employing 30,000 workers (including four factories located in the 
two new EU Member States), 10 isoglucose producers, producing 690 000 tonnes (and no inulin 
syrup producer).    
It may be tempting to apportion all of these changes to the reform process.  However, there had 
been an ongoing process of rationalisation within both beet growing and processing in many EU 
countries prior to the reforms.  For example in the UK, the number of factories had declined from 9 
to 6 in the years ahead of the reform.  In addition, of the two factories closed in the UK it is likely, 
given its relative size, that Allscot would have been closed even in the absence of the reforms.  These 
issues aside it is certainly the case that the reforms have sped up the restructuring process in the EU 
and the UK. 
Our analysis estimates that the reforms would have led to a reduction of around 28 per cent of the 
workforce in beet production as compared to the baseline situation.  Within the beet growing sector 
farms will be able to switch to other crops, such that the impact on overall farm employment will be 
considerably less than 28 per cent.  In the processing sector it is estimated that approximately one-
third of the workers would be made redundant, again when compared to the baseline situation. 
In addition to the rationalisation of processing facilities major restructuring has been taking place 
through a process of mergers and takeovers of sugar companies, the creation of new joint ventures 
and the development of marketing alliances, both within the EU and globally.  The restructuring 
process has seen a further consolidation of ownership across Europe, with over 80 per cent of the 
EU sugar sector now being in the hands of eight companies, and a growing engagement of EU beet 
refiners in international trade in cane sugar produced outside the EU.  For example, Associated 
British Foods (owners of British Sugar) now has almost two-thirds of its sugar production outside the 
EU, while managers at the French sugar company Tereos (now the second biggest sugar maker in 
Brazil) expect its business to be ‘more and more global’ and ‘less and less French’.  Again, whilst this 
agglomeration process may have been occurring to some extent ahead of the reforms,  they have 
speeded up the process.  
Competitiveness of EU Production 
The EU Court of Auditors (2010) were unequivocal in their conclusion that overall the reform process 
did not fully ensure the future competitiveness of the EU sugar industry via a selective reduction of 
unprofitable production capacity.  For example, whilst the proportion of available sugar production 
quota renounced was significantly higher in the regions considered to have low/medium 
productivity, some 2.4 million tonnes was relinquished by producers with factories located in regions 
considered by the Commission to be most competitive. This said,  EU sugar production is now more 
concentrated in the member states with the highest sugar yields, with these countries accounting 
for 78 per cent of EU sugar production.  
The exit of some of the least competitive producers from the sugar sector has improved the average 
competitiveness of the EU sugar sector, both at the level of beet production and beet processing. It 
has also seen beet processors extend their processing of imported raw cane sugar. It is argued that 
these trends are consistent with the basic objective of the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
reform process: that of shifting sugar production to the areas of the EU most suited to its 
production.   
Within the UK, given the high fixed costs associated with sugar processing, it is inevitable that the 
closure of two factories, and increasing production in the remaining factories will have lowered the 
costs of production.  In addition through associated schemes, production is now, on average, 
occurring closer to factories.  As beet is a bulky crop, haulage is a significant cost in the production 
process and therefore by reducing the distance travelled cost savings would have been made.  The 
reforms have accelerated a process of improved productivity within the UK, which has largely been 
driven by yield improvements.   
As for the wider EU situation, the general perception of stakeholders in relation to the impact of 
competitiveness of the reforms was that the average tonne of beet produced in the EU was now 
produced at lower cost than before, but the reforms did not maximise competitiveness as it did not 
ensure the least efficient production was curtailed.  Taking the UK as an example, whilst in the UK 
context the closure of York may have been justified due to its relative competitiveness with other 
factories in the UK, in EU terms it is likely to have been one of the more competitive factories and 
certainly more so than a number that remained open after restructuring. 
Production 
Ahead of the reform process, the EU was a surplus producer of sugar and a significant player on the 
world market in terms of both exports and, to a lesser extent, imports.  By 2010, the reforms had 
largely achieved their objective of reducing EU production by 6 million tonnes and moving the EU to 
a deficit situation.   
However, it should be noted that the initial reform package appeared to be failing in terms of 
encouraging countries to relinquish quota. The voluntary nature of the initial reforms meant that 
inevitably there was a game of ‘wait and see’ between member states to see whether or not they 
would have to relinquish quota. There was also a perception from stakeholders that despite 
agreeing the reforms, some member states had become increasingly concerned about the impact of 
cessation of sugar production and were using potential loopholes in the initial legislation to 
discourage processors from relinquishing quota.   Thus changes to the reform package were 
implemented  in 2007 to kickstart the process.        
Overall the reforms have had a significant impact on beet production in the EU.  With the area under 
beet decreasing by about 700 thousand hectares between 2005 and 2009. Five countries (Bulgaria, 
Ireland, Latvia, Portugal and Slovenia) stopped producing sugar beet while areas decreased by more 
than 50% in seven countries (Finland, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, Czech Republic and 
Slovakia). The number of beet growers has sharply declined (but the impact of this has been partly 
compensated for by higher sugar yields). 
During 2009/10 production actually begin to increase again (and is forecast to increase again in 
2010/11).  This has been driven by out of quota sugar with a significant proportion of this out of 
quota sugar being used in bioethanol plants (particulary in Germany). In this context, the EU’s 
biofuel policy will clearly play a role in the future of the EU sugar beet sector.   
Trade 
Our modelling highlights that the reforms have led to alternative trade patterns emerging both 
internally within the EU as well as externally.  Internally, cessation of production in a number of 
countries provides opportunities for those remaining in production.  Externally the significant 
decline in EU sugar on the world market has provided opportunities for other countries.  It would 
appear that Brazil and Thailand have been amongst the main beneficiaries of the disappearance of 
EU sugar from the world market. 
In terms of traditional suppliers to the EU, our analysis clearly highlights that as a group they suffer a 
decline in trade and economic welfare. However, the impact is shown to vary considerably across 
ACP countries, depending upon such factors as their cost structure, size of internal market, access to 
alternative markets, ability to diversify into other sectors ,etc.    
The situation after the implementation of the reforms is complex with several countries in the 
process of adjustment and others leaving sugar production altogether.  In one sense the reforms 
have had a similar impact in ACP countries as within Europe and that is leading to decline in high 
cost production. In economic terms it may be seen as a positive rather than a negative if high cost 
production in these countries is reduced because of the reforms.  However, in social terms it is 
important that the compensation is adequate and that alternative rural employment opportunities 
can be found.  
In this respect, our study found a number of issues relating to the transitional aid given to the ACP 
countries (effectively compensation for the EU price cuts).  These relate to the extent of the 
transitional aid, how it has been allocated and also the timing of payments.   There was some 
concern that the level of transitional aid given to the ACP countries did not match that paid to EU 
producers in the face of the price cuts.  The decision to allocate the task of distributing the 
transitional aid to DG Development rather than say DG Agri has led to a number of conflicts between 
those wishing to use the money to invest in improving the efficiency of the sector, against those who 
wish to use the money for wider development purposes, such as general infrastructure.  There have 
also been delays in paying out the transition compensation. 
Whilst it is often cited that the EU shortages have been caused because of production problems in 
the ACP countries, it is clear that, whilst this is part of the problem, the situation is more complex 
than this.  It is not just about production but also consumption.  For example, when EU prices were 
high there was an incentive for ACP countries to export all their sugar to the EU and then buy 
supplies from the cheaper world market.  Now the EU price has fallen, and the world price has risen, 
it may be that this incentive has diminished and more sugar is being kept for domestic consumption.  
In addition, there has been a steady global rise in the demand for sugar increasing the competition 
with the EU for sugar supplies.  It is argued that the EU failed to take account of the impact of these 
factors when assessing the possible implications of reform.  
Welfare 
Using a specific measure of welfare derived from the GTAP model (known as equivalent variation 
(EV), at the EU27 level, the gain from the sugar reforms (vs. the baseline) is approximately half a 
billion euros (€566 million), which amounts to a little under 0.01% of EU27 GDP.  Whilst some 
member states and groups of states gain more, it is worth noting that in macroeconomic terms, all 
EU regions realise (at least some) real income gains from the sugar reforms. 
In the EU, these EV welfare results are motivated principally by gains that arise because the 
contraction of sugar activities releases resources into relatively more efficient (i.e., less subsidised) 
activities (as measure by improvements in allocative efficiency). The largest gains accrue to Italy 
(€133 million), whilst other notable improvements appear in those areas that were ‘less’ efficient 
before the reform process. Whilst Irish and Portuguese sugar sectors collapse, neither sector is 
particularly large. Thus, allocative efficiency gains are relatively small (€56 million and €20 million, 
respectively). 
Elsewhere, the more important determinant of the welfare (EV) change in the non-EU regions 
relates to the terms of trade (ToT), particularly where sugar is an important export crop. For 
example, in the LDC/ACP regions, despite the increase in the world price of sugar, the quantity of 
sugar exports has dropped due to preference erosion within the EU, which depresses factor prices in 
these regions, resulting in a net export price index fall. Subsequently, the terms of trade values are 
negative with respect to the baseline. The exception is South Africa, which increases its output, 
bidding up factor and export prices. On the other hand, as a net sugar exporter, Brazilian sugar 
production benefits from the increase in sugar world prices, realising a ToT gain of €142 million. 
Compensation 
Our analysis also considered the issue of compensation for growers and processors in light of the 
reforms.  Given its sensitive nature, secondary data on actual sugar compensation by region was not 
publicly obtainable. Consequently, we have employed a series of plausible assumptions and 
calculations made within the model. Based upon these calculations it does appear that the degree of 
compensation to EU producers was in excess of the estimated loss to producers, Italian sugar 
producers receive the most generous net compensation package (€151 million).  Though due to the 
fact these were based on assumptions, these estimates should be treated with caution. 
Discussion 
The previous section has assessed the impacts of the reforms on such areas as prices, profitability, 
structures, and  trade.  In this section, the various strands of analysis are pulled together to provide a 
summary of the overall impact and also to highlight some unresolved and emerging issues.   
At the outset it is necessary to realise that the reforms arose out of a process of negotiation 
between countries with different aims and objectives.  Therefore within this political process it is 
inevitable that the economic optimum would not be achieved, and this is certainly the case. 
Enhancing competitiveness 
In simple economic terms, it is clear that the approach adopted to the reforms was not the most 
cost-effective way to achieve the aim of enhancing the competitiveness of the EU beet producing 
sector.  This is in no small part due to the fact that the process did not focus on maximising 
improvements in competitiveness because it did not ensure that the least cost production left the 
industry.  As the ECA (2010) identified, a major flaw was that there were actually no up-to-date or 
reliable figures as to the actual costs of production of sugar in the different states ahead of the 
reform.   
A notable issue was the removal from the final agreement of the initial proposal to allow quota to be 
traded across EU countries.  Short of the removal of quota itself it is likely that allowing trade would 
be the most likely way to ensure that production moved to the most efficient areas (where costs of 
beet growing plus costs of refining were minimised).  Of course, a number of (largely political) 
reasons can be seen why member states would not favour such transfers of quota, but it does mean 
that the structural process of reform has occurred within rather than between countries and why 
ultimately a share of the target reduction had to be bourne by some of the more efficient regions of 
Europe. 
Further, the voluntary nature of the reform process and flexibility offered to countries in instigating 
the initial 2006 reforms meant that it was perhaps inevitable that the sought after reductions from 
the least competitive regions were not immediately forthcoming and that changes had to be made 
to the scheme.  Stakeholders pointed out that part of the problem was that there was a game of 
wait and see being played.  Also countries that initially agreed to the nature of the reform package 
may have become more concerned with the potential implications of cessation of production on 
rural areas.  Therefore it has been speculated that some countries made the most of ‘loopholes’ in 
the legislation to delay the reform process. The implicit threat of overall quota cuts ahead of the 
second stage meant that it led to a significant proportion of more competitive production being 
relinquished.  
In addition, though subject to a number of important caveats, our analysis highlights that there may 
have been some over compensation for the losses occurred through the implementation of the price 
cuts.  This result from the modelling does seem intuitively plausible as prices have not fallen as far as 
anticipated and also as restructuring has occurred the overall efficiency has improved reducing the 
compensation needs.  In a political sense it may have been expected that some degree of initial 
overcompensation would be needed for voluntary reforms to work especially given that this was the 
first reform of the regime in over 40 years.   
Concentration 
As noted, the reforms have led to a very different industry emerging in Europe.  The upshot of this is 
that now processing capacity is concentrated in even fewer hands.  This coupled with the fact that, 
despite the rhetoric, there is still tight control of imports into the EU does lead to the potential for 
market power to be exercised.  This is the fundamental opportunity that still needs to be addressed.  
In order to be more competitive internationally, the EU firms need to gain maximum economies of 
scale through these mergers, alliances, takeovers etc.   However, because the domestic market is 
actually heavily protected from overseas competition,  it means that the reforms have reduced the 
number of competitor businesses within the EU. One sugar user indicated that the level of 
concentration has so far proved beneficial,  in that they have to deal with fewer sellers in order to 
secure supply throughout Europe, and they have yet to see the other side of this in terms of any 
potentially anti-competitive behaviours.  They also have witnessed a narrowing of the gap between 
prices in different parts of the EU after the reforms when compared to the situation before 2006.   
This leads to the next section in which issues surrounding the manufacturing industries are discussed  
Manufacturing industry(sugar users) 
In terms of sugar users there are a number of outcomes of the reform process, relating to prices, 
supply and exports. 
Prices 
As one stakeholder put it, sugar users have to understand that the EU has moved from a situation of 
a generally high (in relation to other regions of the world) but stable price to one which has generally 
been lower since the reforms, but more volatile.  This volatility does present challenges with 
planning but also does present other challenges.  Another stakeholder illustrated the potential issues 
through the following example.  In a situation where everyone faces the same high price then they 
are competing on a level playing field.  Inject volatility into the mix and then potentially it is possible 
to gain a market advantage.  For example if you are supplying own label biscuits into supermarkets 
(a very competitive area) then if you can secure your sugar for 100 euro less than your competitors 
you can gain quite a significant advantage. 
Shortages 
Shortages (or tight supplies) that have been witnessed particularly in the 2010/11 marketing year. 
An ongoing situation of deficit in domestic production, coupled with the fact that the foreseen 
increase in imports did not appear, has in the past year led to shortages occurring.  This has been 
one of the main unforeseen consequences of the reform (though a number of commentators stated 
that they had argued this point during the discussions concerning the reforms).  The problem as seen 
by stakeholders is that because the deficit was unforeseen in the analysis that had been undertaken 
for assessing the impact of the reforms then no proper measures were in place to deal with it.  As 
witnessed at the end of 2010 and through 2011, a rather ad hoc process has been used of allowing 
out of quota sugar onto the market as well as increasing the level of imports that can enter under 
favourable rates.  Concerns have been raised that this was too little too late and that the 
Commission refused to accept that a real shortage existed within the EU. This brings us back to the 
role of prices and the weaknesses in the official price data as discussed earlier.  In addition it has 
been pointed out that this process, of allowing out of quota sugar onto the domestic market has 
favoured beet over cane sugar and therefore is going counter to the aim of balancing between the 
two types of sugar.  Having spent at least 6 billion Euros removing sugar from the EU market, it may 
seem rather counter intuitive to consider increasing production again. Although food and drink 
manufacturers, to a large extent, will not care where the sugar comes from as long as it comes onto 
the market. 
A number of stakeholders criticised the nature of the EU’s ex-ante evaluation of the impact of the 
reforms.  In particular they felt that the reforms were not  sufficiently tested in terms of how they 
might perform against various scenarios.  They drew attention to how little work was undertaken as 
to what would happen if world prices rose above EU prices.   Although it may be argued in the EU’s 
defence that given the huge disparity between EU and world prices in the period leading up to the 
reform this scenario was almost unthinkable.  
In fact the most pressure placed on the EU commission at the time of the reform discussions was 
from those that were worried about a flood of duty free sugar entering the EU market to the 
detriment of the domestic industries.  Therefore, facilities were made to cap the quantity of sugar 
entering, but nothing done to address the reverse issue of insufficient sugar entering the market.  
The shortages and subsequent price rises have placed increasing strain on the relationships through 
the supply chain.  In particular between processors and refiners and customers.  There have been 
claims of contracts being broken and forced renegotiations in this financial year.  Although for the 
refiners at least part of the problem is that given high world prices they have to compete or will not 
receive the sugar.  
Although claims have been made that manufacturers have been relocating or planning to relocate 
production outside of the EU due to high sugar costs, this did not appear to be a significant issue 
when stakeholders were interviewed.  It seemed that the decision to relocate was based on wide 
range of economic (and other) factors and that sugar price was only one of these and not the key 
one.  In fact if sugar had been the driving factor, the irony would have been that the EU at the 
present time is one of the lowest cost sugar regions in the world. 
In addition, whilst the current situation does not favour sugar users,  it should be noted  that in the 
early years of the reform, when EU production had not declined as far as expected and the EU was 
constrained on use of export refunds due to the WTO agreements, they had the upper hand in price 
negotiation.  As identified by Agri-trade this was traumatic time for processors in terms of 
profitability.   
Export refunds  
The demise of export subsidies and replacement with increased emphasis on Inward Processing 
Relief (IPR) has also raised some concerns for manufacturers.  In theory the IPR allows firms to buy 
on the world market an equivalent quantity of sugar as that included in any products that are 
exported outwith the EU.  However, there appears to be a problem in the implementation of the 
legislation. The problem arises due to the different interpretation of the rules between EU countries.  
For example one stakeholder pointed out that it is permitted to triangulate within UK8, within France 
it is harder and in the Czech Republic then the manufacturing company needs to physically bring in 
the sugar itself.  Given that the Czech Republic is landlocked the transport costs of doing this are 
prohibitive.  
Isoglucose  
As part of the reform quotas for isoglucose production were increased.  However, they are still tiny 
in relation to the sugar quota. As one stakeholder put it if you have peanuts and someone offers you 
slightly bigger peanuts it is not particularly helpful.  Their concern is that the quota does not allow 
the industry to achieve scale economies in production and therefore make it more efficient.  There 
have always been tensions between sugar production and this sector, which it may be argued only 
really developed because of the protection offered to sugar producers.  However, they do feel they 
could be competitive with sugar in a  truly liberalised market. 
Balance is another key aspect between the indigenous beet producing industry and the cane refining 
sector.  A key issue is that currently the refining sector are finding it hard to secure sufficient sugar 
to maintain production at capacity.  Given the very large fixed costs involved in sugar refining then 
spare capacity can prove very costly.  The problem has arisen, as we have seen, because the 
available production from traditional suppliers has declined markedly due to structural changes.  In 
addition, some suppliers, the most noticeable being Mauritius, have found new markets in the EU, 
now supplying white rather than raw sugar.  The restrictions on imports mean that the refiners are 
unable to substitute non LDC or ACP sugar to compensate for this.  In their view they are facing the 
worst of both worlds under the current regime – that is they are suffering from the regulated market 
without enjoying the direct benefits of the protection offered, unlike the beet processors. 
This question also emerges in terms of competition between processors and refiners.  A beet 
processing plant can be converted to take raw cane sugar but not vice versa.  Therefore, given the 
large fixed costs associated with refining, it may be the case that the beet processors can either 
outbid refiners in terms of securing supply or produce at lower costs 
Within the reforms there is a need to keep a balance between the various interests.  As pointed out 
in discussion, the refining industry employs around a 1000 workers within Europe and the starch and 
isoglucose industries utilise a greater area of wheat and potatoes than that grown for sugar beet.   
Trade Issues 
In one sense the fact that the EU has not been challenged within the WTO since the reforms 
highlights that at least one of the sub-objectives of the reforms has been met.   
An emerging issue is the possible impact of bilateral trade deals.  The stalling of the multilateral WTO 
talks has given greater impetus to bi-lateral deals.  The EU can clearly see gains from these talks 
which may increase access for service industries and other industrial sectors. However, in return 
there is a demand for greater access for sugar into the EU.  We therefore have a situation whereby 
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 Triangulation refers to the ability of the exporting firm to sell on the right to import the sugar equivalent to a 
third party. 
these agreements can potentially undermine agricultural policy. Of course many of these talks, for 
example between the EU-Mercusor, are largely in their infancy and it is unlikely that the impact will 
be felt immediately.  However, they do offer potential future sources of sugar for the refining 
industry in Europe which may increase competition with the beet sector. 
Our study  clearly highlighted the difficulties that have been faced by many of the traditional sugar 
trading countries with the EU.  It is interesting that for a long time the arrangements with the ACP 
countries were seen almost as a form of aid. in economic terms it has long been argued that the 
Sugar Protocol was an inefficient way to support these countries if that was the aim (Sturgess, 1992).  
This may have been behind the decision to allocate the transitional aid to DG Development rather 
than DG Agri.  However, as highlighted earlier this has led to challenges within the sugar sector of a 
number of the ACP countries as those wishing to use the money to invest in improving the efficiency 
of the sector have come up against those who wish to use the money for wider development 
purposes, such as general infrastructure.  As pointed out earlier in terms of economics it may be 
seen as a positive rather than a negative if high cost production in these countries is reduced 
because of the reforms.  However, in social terms it is important that the compensation is adequate 
and that alternative rural employment opportunities can be found. The delay in paying out the 
transition compensation and also the fact that attempts to improve efficiency appear to be thwarted 
in some countries is concerning. 
Market stabilisation and guaranteeing of supplies 
The Court of Auditors (2010) found that while relative market stability had been assured up to the 
time of their analysis, and prices on the EU sugar market had been stable to date around the 
reference prices, it has been achieved through the use of production quotas which currently set the 
maximum allowed internal production at a level of production markedly below internal market 
requirements, at 85 per cent of EU consumption. As a result, EU supplies became increasingly 
dependent on imports while new uses for sugar placed increasing demands on supplies.  
However, the situation identified by the Court, has changed markedly as pointed out by Agritrade-
CTA (2010). While the sugar reference price was reduced by 36 per cent, the ‘exceptional market 
conditions’ that prevailed in 2009/10 saw the world market price of sugar reach record price levels 
(up to 30 US cents/lb), which were some 29 per cent above the EU reference price. For the first time 
since the 1970s, world market sugar prices were not only substantially above the reference price but 
also ‘well above the market price for EU quota sugar’. This has created a situation where, at least on 
a temporary basis, the EU reference price has become a true ‘safety net’ price and has no influence 
on price formation in the EU sugar sector.  
Under the exceptional market conditions for the period 2009/10 EU sugar prices have been largely 
determined by the world market price of sugar.  This allowed the EC to table a regulation on 27 
January 2010 for ‘the export of an additional 500,000 tonnes of out-of-quota sugar in the 2009/10 
marketing year’ (up to 31 July 2010), without in its view violating its WTO obligations (since, the EC 
argues, at current world market prices EU companies can profitably export without any need for 
cross-subsidisation). It was argued by the EC and the EU beet industry that this measure ‘can 
contribute to easing the tight demand situation on the world market’, to the benefit of consumers in 
poor countries. As raised earlier in the report, the degree of industrial concentration in the sugar 
sector does lead to questions as to the extent that consumers benefit from changes in sugar prices. 
The EC also recognises that ‘the present market situation for sugar is very unlikely to occur again in 
the future’. 
As a consequence, the EC is committed to keeping the situation under constant review. While high 
world market prices have facilitated the EU reform process, it is recognised that the situation is likely 
to change as global production responds to high global sugar prices. Against this background, the EC 
remains committed to a managed sugar trade regime, with the success of market management 
measures being an important determinant of whether preventive withdrawals of production quotas 
are necessary, and indeed whether further reductions in the sugar reference price will be required 
as part of the 2013 round of CAP reforms. 
Looking forward 
Recent draft proposals from the EU suggest that the EU sugar quota regime is set to be abolished at 
the end of September 2015.  The Commission appears to be seeking to steer the sugar sector 
towards greater market orientation, encourage a higher level of competitiveness and put an end to 
restricted EU exports. Removal of the quota regime is seen to pave the way for the lifting of export 
restrictions, as the non WTO-compliant issue of ‘cross-subsidisation’ will be addressed.  It is likely 
that a further fall in EU prices and actual increased production in the EU is likely to have knock on 
effects on developing countries. 
Unsurprisingly, given the views expressed to us during the review of the 2006 reforms, the ACP 
Group has spoken out in opposition to the proposed move to abolish the sugar quota system. They 
argue that the current regime “has shown its capacity to properly manage extreme world market 
disruptions, by ensuring a safe & reasonably-priced supply of sugar to European consumers”. They 
also are concerned over the lack of policy coherence between the floated proposals and EU 
Development Policy and trade commitments. 
A related issue is the relationship between refiners and ACP countries as well as with domestic beet 
production.  It was clear from the evaluation of the 2006 reforms that they want to ensure a level 
playing field with beet processors.  They feel they do not have this and they expressed concerns that 
simple quota liberalisation without liberalising the restrictive import constraints would be 
detrimental.  For example, in the UK quota liberalisation could allow beet production to increase and 
introduce greater competition pressure on the refiners (given the generally inelastic nature of 
demand).  If cane refiners were able to access world markets more generally for sugar then they 
would be more able to respond accordingly and maintain market share.  However, if they are 
constrained, as they currently are, to a limited number of suppliers (who are not necessarily the 
lowest cost suppliers) this will hamper their ability to compete.   However, liberalising imports would 
erode the preferential access of ACP and LDC suppliers. This could hamper the sugar industry in ACP 
and LDC countries and engender serious economic and social consequences, particularly in countries 
that are heavily dependent on sugar and have limited options for diversification.  Therefore the 
extent of wider liberalisation will form a key part of developing scenarios. 
 
In a wider context, (although some extent based on generalisations, it is possible to classify the 
following stances towards further reforms amongst key stakeholder groups:  
• Sugar beet processors and producers - argue for retention of basic measures on the ground 
of stability, certainty of supply, European food security etc.  
• End-Users are mainly concerned with ensuring that the sugar supply market is competitive 
• Isoglucose/starch sector are pushing for complete liberalisation 
• Cane refiners are seeking what may be termed equivalence of treatment (particularly in 
terms of access to supplies) to allow them to compete on an equal footing with the domestic 
beet industry 
• ACP countries - want stability, and a remunerative market with controlled access 
 
An emerging issue that was identified through the study is the possible impact of bilateral trade 
deals on the EU sugar regime.  The stalling of the multilateral WTO talks has given greater impetus to 
bi-lateral deals.  The EU can clearly see gains from these talks which may increase access to new 
markets for their service industries (and other industrial sectors). However, in return there is a 
demand for greater access for sugar into the EU.  As this increased access is granted, there is 
potential for a situation whereby these agreements can potentially undermine EU agricultural policy 
which may be more restrictive of imports. However, this increased access will also provide additional 
sources of raw sugar for the refining industry in Europe, which will increase competition with the 
beet sector. 
In terms of trade liberalisation it is clear that through the process of mergers and takeovers the 
distinction between the EU sugar industry and the rest of the world is much less clear.  Situations are 
therefore likely to arise in the coming years where the interests of the larger sugar companies 
progressively become more global. This is already starting to happen for example with ABF, 
Sudzucker and Tereos. This could introduce differences of approach  between their EU and global 
operations. 
Through the findings highlighted in this paper, it is clear that both the approach adopted and the 
process of implementation had a number of strengths but also weaknesses.  In conclusion, Table 
attempts to summarise the key issues surrounding the reform.  Of course, it is  necessary to 
recognise the possible opposing interests of stakeholders, that is what is seen as a positive to one 
may be perceived as a negative by another.  These provide insight into issues that may emerge with 
the further reforms proposed for 2015. 
Table 2  Potential Strengths and Weaknesses of EU Sugar Regime Reform 
Positive Negative 
Production 
EU Industry rationalised 
 
Growers restructured Growers had little say in restructuring process -  
presented as fait accompli 
Surplus capacity cut with approximately 75 
factories closed 
Restructuring  to some extent impeded by politics and 
therefore some relatively efficient factories (in European 
context) closed whilst some relatively inefficient factories 
remain open 
Subsidised exports cut  
Subsidised quota exports and export refunds 
eliminated – no subsequent challenges under the 
WTO 
Exports restricted to 1.4 mt/year – Question as to 
whether out of quota now subsidised within the EU.  If 
not then should in theory be able to export this 
Exports cut from 6 mt to 1 mt EU potentially disadvantaged globally as more efficient 
producers may be unable to expand in response to 
improved world market – particular issue for UK industry 
EU changed from major global exporter to major 
importer 
World market changes have made imports unreliable and 
therefore shortages have been developing and this has 
come to a head in 2010/11  
Increased efficiency and competitiveness of 
remaining industries 
Mechanisms adopted did not ensure that the least 
efficient 6 million tonnes was taken out of production. 
Process of merger, acquisition, take-over  has 
strengthened remaining processing firms also 
diversifying into other non-EU countries 
Significantly reduced number of processors in European 
market may hamper competition (no evidence yet) 
Prices 
EU prices cut >€720 to €490 
Sugar users have faced generally lower prices 
Increase linkage between world and EU prices appears to 
have increased volatility 
Question as to extent the lower prices have transmitted 
to end consumers 
Official price statistics seen as inadequate in reflecting 
changes in market balances and hence triggering 
remedial action 
Access 
LDCs and ACP given unrestricted access 
Brazil and other major producers given substantial 
access 
 
Refining restrictions lifted:  
Better prices and more choice for developing 
country cane producers 
 
Lower prices within EU market leads to increased 
efficiency in ACP countries 
 
Imports have proved unreliable due to structural changes 
occurring due to substantial price reductions coninciding 
with improved opportunities elsewhere 
Import regulations still rigid 
 
Due to decline in traditional sources and inability to 
import from other producers, refiners have been unable 
to maintain capacity, reducing efficiency 
 
Demise of high cost producers whilst improving efficiency 
may have social and cultural impacts 
Concerns raised over extent, timing and nature of 
transitional aid for ACP countries 
Other 
Out of quota able to be used for alternative uses, 
including renewable energy – growth area 
 
Competitive industries (isoglucose etc) faced significant 
reduction in market due to loss of industrial market. 
Increase in quota for isoglucose Quota too small to enable competitive industries to 
achieve true economies of scale.  
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Appendix 1:     
 
I. Deriving the Mark-Up  
i) as total revenue (industry price (P) multiplied by firm 
output (Qi)) minus total costs (TCi). 
 
iii
TCQP  .       (A.1) 
 
Under Cournot conjecture, maximise profit with respect to firm output. Using the product rule gives: 
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where Z is industry output. Rearranging: 
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Multiply both sides by (P/P)(Z/Z) and manipulating gives: 
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The derived value for the inverse elasticity demand depends on whether the destination market is 
domestic or foreign. 
 
II. Deriving the levels inverse demand function for domestic markets 
The CES armington demand function for domestic (r=s) good ‘i’ is represented in levels form as: 
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where Qi,r,s is the demand, QCi,s is the composite demand (over domestic and foreign) in destination 
region ‘s’, and Pi,r,s and PCi,s Rearranging (A.6) in terms of Pi,r,s gives the inverse demand function: 
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Take the derivative of (A.7) (product and chain rules) with respect to domestic (r=s) demands: 
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Multiplying (A.8) by (Qi,r,s/Pi,r,s) and substituting the derivative expression: 
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Yields the inverse elasticity: 
 














si
si
si
si
isi
sri
sri
si
isri
sri
sri
sri
PC
QC
QC
PC
QC
Q
Q
QC
P
Q
Q
P
,
,
,
,
,
,,
,,
,
,,
,,
,,
,, 11

   (A.10) 
 
In expression (A.10), the derivative QC/Q can be calculated by taking the derivative of the 
underlying CES function: 
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and multiplying the result by (Qi,r,s /QCi,s) gives : 
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where Si,r,s is the expenditure share of good ‘i’ from region ‘r’ over demand for ‘i’ from all regions ‘r’ 
(r=s and r≠s). Substituting (A.12) into (A.10) and take the negative of the inverse elasticity of the 
derivative to obtain the absolute value of the inverse elasticity of demand for domestic (r=s) 
representative varieties.  
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Moreover, following Blake et al. (1998), assuming that the absolute value of the inverse elasticity of 
demand for the composite good (QCi,s) is equal to unity: 
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III. Deriving the Inverse Elasticity of Demand for Foreign (rs) goods 
Following Blake et al. (1998), the inverse elasticity of demand for exports from ‘r’ (r≠s) is given as: 
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where Mi,r,s are imports in region destination region ‘s’, Pi,r is the price in export region ‘r’, PMi,r,s is 
the import price (post tariff) in region ‘s’, and Xi,r,s is the export quantity. In the model, the market 
clearing accounting conventions of the model impose the constraint that the export and import 
quantities along a given bilateral trade route are equal, such that: 
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and:  
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To calculate P/PM × PM/P (i.e., the elasticity of changes in export prices in ‘r’ with respect to 
changes in import prices in ‘s’) start from the levels expressions in the model for the “free on board” 
(PFOBi,r,s) export price and the “market” (PMi,r,s) and “cost insurance freight” (PCIFi,r,s) import prices: 
 sriri
ri
sri
TXSTX
P
PFOB
,,,
,
,,
.

     (A.18)  
sririsrisri
TMSTMPCIFPM
,,,,,,,
.     (A.19) 
 
PTPFOBPCIF
srisri

,,,,
     (A.20) 
 
where 
TXi,r/ TXSi,r,s – Generic/Bilateral specific export tax/subsidy. 
TMi,r/ TMSi,r,s – Generic/Bilateral specific import tax/subsidy. 
Pi,r – Export market price in region ‘r’.  
PT – Global shipping sector per unit freight price 
Substitute (A.18) into (A.20) 
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Substitute (A.21) into (A.19): 
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Rearrange in terms of Pi,r: 
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Taking the derivative gives: 
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Multiplying by PMi,r,s / Pi,r, substituting (A.22) and cancelling terms gives: 
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Combining each of these terms into the inverse elasticity of demand for exports of region 'r' (r≠s) 
(expression A.15) gives: 
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and substituting into the mark-up expression (A.4) gives the mark-up on foreign sales (rs) 
 
 
 
  
Appendix  2: Composition of the 29 aggregated GTAP regions 
Aggregated region (29) GTAP Region (112) 
United Kingdom United Kingdom 
France France 
Germany Germany 
Ireland Ireland 
Italy Italy 
Portugal Portugal 
Spain Spain 
Poland Poland 
EUA (formerly ‘A’ producers) Finland, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia 
EUB (formerly ‘B’ producers) Belgium, Czech Republic 
EUC (formerly ‘C’ producers) Austria, Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden 
OEU25 (non sugar producers) Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg, Malta 
AC2 Bulgaria, Romania 
Australia Australia 
Brazil Brazil 
Caribbean Caribbean 
China China 
Columbia Columbia 
Guatemala Guatemala 
India India 
Mauritius Mauritius 
Russia Russian Federation 
South Africa South Africa 
Thailand Thailand 
USA USA 
NAfrMEast Iran, Rest of Western Asia, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Rest of North 
Africa 
WAfr Nigeria, Senegal, Rest of West Africa 
LDCACP Lao People's Democratic Republic, Rest of Southeast Asia, 
Bangladesh, Rest of South Asia, Central Africa, South Central 
Africa, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Rest of Eastern Africa, Botswana, 
Rest of South African Customs Union 
ROW New Zealand, Rest of Oceania, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, 
Rest of East Asia, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Canada, Mexico, 
Rest of North America, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Rest of South America, Costa 
Rica, Nicaragua, Panama, Rest of Central America, Switzerland, 
Norway, Rest of EFTA, Albania, Belarus, Croatia, Ukraine, Rest of 
Eastern Europe, Rest of Europe, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Rest of 
Former Soviet Union, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey 
 
  
